The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. In the last thirty years, economists and other social scientists have investigated people's normative views on distributive justice. Here we study people's normative views in social dilemmas, which underlie many situations of economic and social significance. Using insights from moral philosophy and psychology we provide an analysis of the morality of free riding. We use experimental survey methods to investigate people's moral judgments empirically. We vary others' contributions, the framing ("give-some" vs. "take-some") and whether contributions are simultaneous or sequential. We find that moral judgments of a free rider depend strongly on others' behaviour; and that failing to give is condemned more strongly than withdrawing all support.
Introduction
Prominent among Amartya Sen's many enduring contributions are his arguments for enrichment of the concept of agency used in economic analysis and of the information base of welfare economics. 1 Although these arguments suggest that an individual's normative views may be relevant both to the explanation of her behaviour and to her evaluations of states of affairs, they also suggest that it may be hard to infer normative views directly from choice behaviour.
A striking recent development in public economics, reflecting this difficulty, has been increasing use of data on people's normative attitudes obtained with surveys or questionnaires. For example, views about distributive justice and redistributive policy have been examined by Fong (2001) , Gaertner et al. (2001) , Corneo and Grüner (2002) , Faravelli (2007) , Gaertner and Schwettmann (2007) , and Corneo and Fong (2008) . 2 In this paper, we extend the empirical investigation of normative views to a different economic context, namely social dilemma (public goods) games, and a different type of normative view, namely moral judgment. 3 More specifically, we report an experiment that, using techniques adapted from moral psychology, explores how people judge the morality of a free rider in a social dilemma game.
A social dilemma arises when members of a group share the benefits of a common resource but each has to decide individually how much to contribute to its provision.
Contribution is costly to the contributor but helps all other group members. Thus, a social dilemma isolates a conflict between personal interest, which militates for free riding, and collective interest, which requires contribution. The ubiquity of social dilemmas makes them important for economics and social science; and the conflict of interest they embody makes them potentially fruitful ground for the empirical study of moral judgments. In fact, there are arguments to the effect that the conception of morality itself evolved in response to cooperation problems our ancestors faced. 4 Previous research has shown that people experience negative emotions towards free riders in social dilemmas and that some are willing to incur costs to punish them. 5 However, little is known about people's moral judgment of free riders. Although it 1 See, for example, the essays collected in Sen (1982a) and Sen (2002) . 2 See Konow (2003) and Gaertner (2009) for overviews. 3 Moral judgments can be "defined as evaluations (good vs. bad) of the actions or character of a person that are made with respect to a set of virtues held to be obligatory by a culture or subculture" (Haidt (2001), p. 817) . 4 e.g. Ridley (1996) ; Binmore (2005) ; Hauser (2006) ; Gintis et al. (2008) , Krebs (2008) . 5 e.g. Fehr and Gächter (2000) ; Fehr and Gächter (2002) ; Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) ; Cubitt et al. (2008) ; Gächter and Herrmann (2009). seems that many people dislike free riders when directly affected by their behaviour, it does not follow that free riding is viewed as morally reprehensible. Croson and Konow (2009) provide evidence of a difference between normative judgments reached from the standpoints of "stakeholder" and impartial observer in dictator games; and the same difference could apply in social dilemmas. We ask: when judgment is not confounded with self-interest from being an affected party, is free riding still judged to be wrong? And, if so, what factors influence how severe a transgression it is seen as?
In our study, subjects (n=538) were confronted with hypothetical scenarios involving a two-player public goods game in which one player free rides. For each scenario, subjects were asked to express their positive or negative moral rating of the free rider, without themselves being involved in the decision situation. As they were merely observers, their judgments should represent impartial moral evaluations.
Our experimental design manipulates three aspects of the scenarios. First, we manipulate the behaviour of the non-judged player to see whether subjects' moral judgments of the free rider depend on this. Our second manipulation investigates how moral judgments depend on the order of moves in the scenarios. In particular, we explore whether the sensitivity of judgments of the free rider to the action of the nonjudged player is affected by whether the free rider knew the other player's behaviour when choosing his own. Third, we explore whether moral judgments are sensitive to contextual cues provided by the framing of the decision problem. The framing manipulation we study has a Give versus Take form. This manipulation is common in studies of social dilemma games, 6 but its impact on moral judgments in that context has not been studied before, to our knowledge.
We find that that free riding is perceived as a morally blameworthy action in all our scenarios, except for one case in which it is seen as morally praiseworthy. The exceptional case is the one, which we will call "ratting on a rat", in which the judged free rider moves second, after observing that the other player has free ridden too. We provide evidence that, irrespective of whether moves are simultaneous or sequential, the higher is the other player's contribution, the more negative is the moral rating assigned to the free rider on average. Interestingly, this pattern of judgments is also observed at an individual level for a substantial minority of subjects in the simultaneous case and for an overwhelming majority in the sequential case. Finally, we find a strong framing effect in moral evaluations: other things equal, subjects condemn withdrawing support from the public good less than the corresponding equivalent action of failing to contribute to it.
We see these findings as a contribution not just to economics but also to the emerging literature in moral psychology and empirical moral philosophy (Haidt (2001) , Nichols (2004) , Haidt (2007) , Nado et al. (2009) ). This literature investigates how people arrive at moral judgments in a number of contexts. By extending it to cover free riding in social dilemmas, we make a contribution that is both conceptual and empirical. We analyse a typical experimental social dilemma problem from the perspectives of two accounts of how people form moral judgments: the reason-based model and the emotion-based model. Although our experimental design is not intended to test between those models, each model provides a distinct framework for analysing how our experimental manipulations may affect moral judgments. We explain this in Section 3, after describing our main design features in Section 2.
Section 4 gives details of experimental procedures. Finally, Section 5 presents, and Section 6 discusses, our empirical results. 
Experimental design: scenarios and treatments
In our experiment, each subject responded to a questionnaire requiring her to report her moral judgment of a player in hypothetical scenarios. There were four treatments, each defined by a different questionnaire. Each subject responded to the questionnaire for one treatment only.
Each questionnaire described a decision problem for two fictitious players, named
Person A and Person B; and then gave some possible endings, each of which specified players' choices and their consequences. A scenario comprises a description of a decision problem and an ending. Each questionnaire consisted of five scenarios with the same decision problem, but different endings.
In all scenarios, the players were the two members of a group playing a public good game. Within each questionnaire, the behaviour of Person A varied across scenarios but Person B was always a complete free-rider. After each ending, the subject was asked, as a detached observer, to rate the morality of Person B on a scale ranging from -50 (extremely bad) to +50 (extremely good). Thus, in each treatment, we can test within-subjects for the impact of the behaviour of the non-judged player on the moral rating assigned to the free rider. All other tests are between-subjects and involve comparisons of subjects' responses across treatments.
There were two treatment variables: the framing used to describe the decision problem; and the order of moves in that problem. Each variable had two possible values: "Give" and "Take" for framing; and "Simultaneous" and "Sequential" for order of moves. Each was manipulated independently, yielding four treatments: GiveSimultaneous, Take-Simultaneous, Give-Sequential, and Take-Sequential.
To explain the Give versus Take manipulation, we fix on the Simultaneous order of moves. In the Give frame, the decision facing each player was how much to contribute to a group project; in the Take frame, it was how much to withdraw. The first scenarios in the Give-Simultaneous and Take-Simultaneous treatments are shown in the left-hand and right-hand columns below respectively. (To show the difference between them, we present corresponding Give and Take scenarios side by side here, using bold face for each phrase which differs from the corresponding one in the other framing. However, bold face was not used for these passages when scenarios were presented to subjects and, as explained above, no subject saw both frames).
Give-Simultaneous Take-Simultaneous The Give and Take frames differ only in the description of the scenarios. There is no difference in terms of the feasible sets of monetary outcomes available to a player in corresponding scenarios In each frame, each player controlled the final destination of 20 tokens, each of which could be allocated either to himself (earning £1 for him) or to the project (earning £0.75 for each player). In view of this, we use the term "effective contribution" below to refer to the tokens allocated by a player to the project, regardless of whether this was by means of contributing or not withdrawing.
In addition to the Simultaneous treatments, we ran two treatments (one with the Give frame, and one with Take) in which the non-judged player moved first. Each questionnaire for these Sequential treatments was obtained from the corresponding Simultaneous one by replacing the last sentence of the first paragraph with "Assume that Person A decides first and Person B observes Person A's choice before making his own decision." In all other respects, Sequential questionnaires were identical to the corresponding Simultaneous ones.
Discussion of design from the perspective of moral psychology and philosophy
The philosophical and psychological literatures suggest two broad accounts of how individuals might arrive at their moral judgments which, for convenience, we call the reason-based model and the emotion-based model, respectively. The reason-based model sees an individual's moral judgments as the result of deliberation in which the prior moral principles she endorses are applied to the case at hand. On this account, hypotheses about how subjects' judgments will vary across scenarios would be conditional on assumptions about their prior moral principles and, in particular, about whether those principles imply that the differences between our scenarios are morally relevant.
In contrast, the emotion-based model sees emotions and intuitions as the drivers of moral judgments. On this view, moral judgments express sentiments, caused by quickly-formed moral intuitions which may be followed by ex post moral reasoning.
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On the emotion-based model, whether and how far subjects report different judgments across scenarios would depend on whether there are differences in the nature and intensity of the emotional responses cued by them.
To facilitate our discussion of how our experimental manipulations would be seen by these two models of judgment, we begin by giving names to certain hypotheses.
We refer to the view that moral judgments are insensitive to the Give versus Take manipulation as the frame insensitivity hypothesis. 
The reason-based model
The implications of the reason-based model depend on the prior ethical principles that subjects endorse and, especially, on whether these are consequentialist.
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For a consequentialist ethical theory, the moral value of an action derives from comparison of its consequences with other feasible ones; so re-describing the decision problem, holding actual and feasible consequences constant, should have no impact on the moral value of the action. Thus, if our subjects endorse any form of consequentialism that sees the morally relevant consequences in our scenarios as determined by the monetary outcomes, the reason-based model predicts that the frame insensitivity hypothesis will hold.
For the remainder of the paper, by "consequentialism" we intend a form of the doctrine that has this implication. 11 Thus, if we observe a difference between judgments in the Give and Take frames, the reason-based model would have to interpret it as evidence of subjects endorsing prior ethical principles that are not consequentialist in the sense just described.
The consequentialist argument for frame insensitivity requires the morally relevant consequences of Person B's free-riding to be determined by the monetary outcomes, but it does not depend on how broadly those outcomes are construed.
If they take a narrow view, subjects could see the consequences of Person B's action as consisting only of the payments determined by the tokens in his own control.
This would imply that the "consequence" of Person B making an effective contribution of zero tokens is the same across all scenarios. Then, in addition to frame insensitivity, the independence hypothesis would hold in Simultaneous 10 Blackburn (2008), p. 74, defines consequentialism as the view that the "value of an action derives entirely from its consequences". For an extensive philosophical discussion, see Sinnott-Armstrong (2006) ; for a discussion from an economic point of view see Sen (1987) . 11 When faced with counter-examples, a possible defensive move for advocates of consequentialism might reinterpret consequences to include factors previously not seen as part of them. If "contributing no tokens" and "withdrawing 20 tokens" are interpreted as acts with different consequences, perhaps because only one leads to the "consequence" that a withdrawal has been made, then a framing effect in our design would be compatible with subjects making consequentialist judgments, in the reinterpreted sense. However, taken to the limit, this reinterpretation strategy risks abolishing any distinction between an action and its consequences, so rendering consequentialism trivial. choice. We will call the principle that an agent cannot be condemned on the basis of matters which he neither controls nor knows the responsibility doctrine. If subjects endorse this principle then, even if they are otherwise inclined to view consequences broadly, the independence hypothesis would hold in Simultaneous treatments.
However, there are ethical views which violate the responsibility doctrine and might account for increasing condemnation even in Simultaneous treatments. At first sight, this may seem a strange property for moral principles. But, within a broad consequentialist framework, rationalisation for it can be found in the doctrine of moral luck, discussed by Nagel (1976) and Williams (1981 Finally, if withdrawing and withholding support are seen as intrinsically different actions, application of deontological moral principles could also account for frame sensitivity of judgments of the free rider.
The emotion-based model
On the emotion-based model, it is not necessary to delve into such tricky terrain to account for violations of frame insensitivity and/or the independence hypothesis, because the model does not require moral judgments to flow from coherent principles.
Instead, it sees them as cued by emotional responses to the scenario as a whole.
Evolutionary theorists argue that moral judgments may be situation-specific and frame-dependent (e.g., Krebs (2008) , p. 116). Consistent with this argument, the emotion-based model suggests that subjects' judgments would be driven by gutreactions to whole scenarios which, in turn, may be sensitive to seemingly incidental features of them. For example, the emotional response to a player whose effective contribution is zero might differ according to whether this free riding arises from complete failure to contribute to the project or from maximal withdrawal of support from it. This is possible even though the consequences are the same, and even in the absence of a prior ethical theory that licenses the distinction. 
Procedures
We recruited participants from among University of Nottingham students using the ORSEE software (Greiner (2004) . In total, we sent 2,718 email invitations, resulting in 538 participants. Once a subject registered to take part, they were directed to the experiment's website and allocated automatically to one of the four treatments, in a rotating sequence by time of registration for the experiment.
Each subject saw only the questionnaire for the treatment they were assigned to.
They could either respond to it immediately or exit or return to it any time before the closing date of the experiment (which was one week after invitations were sent).
Subjects returning later could still only see the questionnaire they had been assigned to initially. Subjects were omitted from the data analysis if they failed to complete a questionnaire by the closing date. 12 To counter the possibility of multiple submissions from the same subject, only one registration was permitted from a given invitation.
By using and extending ORSEE recruitment software, rather than employing an open internet experiment, we were able to build in this safeguard and to insure that no invitees had been recruited to previous public goods experiments.
It is inherent to our study that we could not incentivise task-responses, but we could incentivise participation. We comment on these features in turn.
Our objective was to study subjects' impartial moral attitudes. 13 A questionnairebased approach was appropriate for this purpose because any means of tying payments to subjects' responses would introduce a potential confound. 14 In particular, we wished to elicit judgments that subjects would give in the role of a disinterested observer. This precluded having subjects be participants in the public goods game:
hence our use of hypothetical scenarios. Allowing subjects to assign financial penalties or rewards to the players in the scenarios, even hypothetically, would have confounded moral attitudes with attempts to bring about particular distributional consequences: hence our use of pure judgment tasks rather than -say -reward or punishment tasks. As our judgment tasks are moral judgment tasks, as opposed -say -to mathematical puzzles or judgments of distance, there are no objectively "right" or "wrong" answers to them. So, we could not reward subjects for judging correctly.
Finally, rewarding subjects for making judgments that conform to particular ethical theories, or to our own ethical views, or to average opinion, would all have introduced obvious biases, relative to the motivation for our experiment. Our aim was to elicit subjects' own actual judgements, not their beliefs about which judgments would be rewarded or are held by others.
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Given the absence of task-related incentives, we felt that it might be difficult to generate a sufficient number of participants, without some participation incentive. On the other hand, having a substantial reward for participation might have attracted subjects unwilling to give considered responses and only willing to do the minimum necessary to obtain the reward. It might also disproportionally attract people for whom pecuniary concerns are particularly important. In the light of these considerations, we used two approaches in parallel. Prior to issuing invitations, we divided our potential subject pool randomly into two equal sub-groups: one for which there would be no payments at all ("No-Payment experiment") and one in which a random participation fee was provided ("Payment" experiment), in the form of entry 13 For interesting discussions of impartiality in ethical reasoning, see Sen (1993) and Sen (2009 
Results
Before turning to our main questions, we consider the impact of the different participation incentive schemes on participation and task-responses. This is a useful preliminary for what follows, as well as of some independent interest.
We sent the same number of invitations to participate in each experiment; and, in response, 306 subjects completed the Payment experiment, compared with 232 in the No-Payment experiment. This suggests that paying a random participation fee can be an effective (and cheap) way to increase the response rate. A Probit regression analysis reported in the Appendix (Table A1 ) supports this conclusion.
More importantly, the coefficient on the Payment variable in the regression analysis of moral evaluations reported in the Appendix (Table A2) is not statistically significant. Thus, it does not seem that the difference between the two experiments had any important impact on responses. In our view this indicates that there is no selection bias between those who participate in the two experiments. 17 We therefore proceed below by pooling the data.
How is free riding judged? The Simultaneous Case
We begin our main analysis with the Simultaneous treatments, in which, in each scenario, Person A and Person B decide without knowing the action of the other.
Here, and below, the main tool for our analysis is the mean "moral evaluation function" (MEF). This is an aggregate measure of the moral ratings that subjects assigned to the free rider (Person B), expressed as a function of the effective contribution levels of his non-judged counterpart (Person A). Figure 1 shows the mean MEF, for each of the two Simultaneous treatments. 16 All participants in either experiment were informed of the importance of answering the questionnaire as precisely and honestly as possible and that responses would remain confidential. Subjects invited to the Payment experiment were told that those who completed the questionnaire would be entered into a prize draw, conducted publicly with two prizes of £50.Participants were given the date, time, and venue of the draw and invited to attend; they were also told that the winners would be contacted by email if they did not attend, so that payment was not conditional on attendance.
Figure 1 about here
The horizontal axis indicates Person A's effective contribution, measured in number of tokens. The vertical axis indicates the average moral rating that subjects assigned to Person B, who is always a complete free rider. On this axis, the point 0 denotes that free riding is perceived to be of no moral significance. Ratings below 0 imply that subjects perceive free riding as morally blameworthy; whereas ratings above 0 imply that subjects perceive free riding as morally praiseworthy. The 95% confidence intervals for the mean moral evaluation in each of the five scenarios of each treatment are also shown.
Three features of Figure 1 are particularly striking. First, the average moral rating of Person B's free riding is negative in all cases shown, suggesting that subjects do regard the decision problem in the scenarios as having a moral dimension and freeriding as a blameworthy act. Second, the MEF for the Give treatment is always below that for the Take treatment indicating that, on average, subjects condemn total failure to contribute to the group project more strongly than complete withdrawal of support from it. Third, for each frame, the MEF is negatively sloped: the free rider is condemned more strongly the greater the other player's net contribution, even though moves are simultaneous.
To understand the observed pattern of judgments better, we divided subjects into three categories (response patterns): (1) subjects with a flat MEF, (2) subjects with a negatively sloped MEF, and (3) "Others", including non-monotonic subjects and subjects with a positively sloped MEF. 18 The mean MEFs for the Give and Take treatments, for each of these three response patterns, are shown in the three panels of Figure 2 , respectively. The percentage of subjects in the relevant treatment falling in a given category is shown, as are the 95% confidence intervals for the mean moral evaluation in each of the five scenarios.
Figure 2 about here
The largest category, accounting for 46.7% and 52.9% of subjects in Give and Take treatments respectively, consists of those whose MEF is flat across the five effective contribution levels of Person A. The overwhelming majority of subjects with a flat MEF assigned a negative rating to the free rider, and the average is indeed highly significantly negative in both treatments. (Only 12.8 percent of subjects thought free riding is of no moral significance and therefore assigned a zero rating across all scenarios.) The second largest category is those subjects for whom free riding is more reprehensible the greater Person A's effective contribution (38.5% and 30.4% of subjects in Give and Take treatments, respectively). The third category ("Others") comprises a minority (14.8% and 16.7% of subjects in Give and Take treatments, respectively) who have neither flat nor monotonically decreasing ratings.
We also investigate moral evaluations in the simultaneous treatments econometrically. Table 2 documents OLS models (with robust errors clustered on subjects), with the moral evaluation of Person B as the dependent variable. We report two sets of models. The first set of models (1) to (4) consists of a variable "Tokens", which takes the values of Person A's effective contribution (0, 5, 10, 15, 20) ; the dummy variable "Take", which equals 1 for the Take treatment, and 0 for the Give treatment; the dummy variable "Male", which equals 1 if subjects were male and 0 otherwise; and finally an interaction variable "Tokens × Take". (3)) and "Others" (model (4)) think free riding in Take is significantly less immoral than free riding in Give. The interaction variable "Tokens × Take" and the dummy "Male" are both insignificant in models (2) to (4).
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The second set of models discards the assumption of linearity in Tokens made in the previous set and splits the variable "Tokens" up into separate dummy variables for the different effective contribution levels of Person A (taking effective contribution of 0 by Person A as the omitted benchmark). This is redundant when the only subjects considered have flat MEFs. But, for each of models (1), (2) and (4), there is a corresponding model (1′), (2′) and (4′) respectively, that uses the separate dummy variables just described in place of "Tokens". All conclusions from the first set of models hold in these less restrictive ones as well. In particular, the mean MEF (model (1′)) is negatively sloped, ceteris paribus, since the coefficients of the four scenario dummy variables are all negative, statistically different from zero, and also jointly different from each other (from F-test, p-value = 0.000), corroborating the increasing condemnation hypothesis.
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It turns out that subjects with a flat MEF and subjects classified as "Others" are (at least weakly) significantly more condemning in the Give than in the Take treatment, whereas for subjects with negatively sloped MEFs frame insensitivity holds in that we find no statistically significant difference across frames. Thus, the existence of a framing effect in our aggregate data for the Simultaneous treatments can be attributed largely to those subjects who condemn free riding equally across scenarios, or to "Others".
Do sequential moves make a difference?
We now non-zero, the mean moral evaluation of the free rider, Player B, is negativeindicating condemnation. Also, the mean MEF for the Give frame again lies below that for the Take frame whenever Person A's effective contribution is non-zero, indicating that the framing effect observed in Simultaneous treatments is largely robust to a sequential order of moves.
The main qualitative differences between Figure 3 and Figure 1 relate to the slope of the MEF, which appears steeper in the Sequential case. Especially when Player A's effective contribution is 10 or more, the average condemnation of Player B is notably stronger in Sequential treatments than in the corresponding Simultaneous treatments.
Also, interestingly, there is a directional difference in the judgment of Person B's free riding, when Person A free rides too. In contrast to the Simultaneous treatments, people in the Sequential treatments regarded it as morally praiseworthy for Player B
to "rat on a rat". Table 3 , this is reflected in significantly positive coefficients on "Tokens", "Take" and the interaction variable "Tokens × Take"; in model (1′), it is shown by the significance of the interaction terms between the framing and scenario dummies.
21 Table 3 about here
Conclusion and discussion of results
This paper contributes to economics and moral psychology by investigating experimentally the moral judgments people pass on an important form of economic behaviour: free riding in public goods games. We see this as a small contribution towards a wider empirical research agenda on agents' ethical views that can be seen as one response to Amartya Sen's concern with the relationship between ethics and economics, especially as it relates to agents' motivations. The idea that ethical commitments may affect behaviour without being reducible to preferences is a longstanding argument of Sen's (see, for example, Sen (1973) and Sen (1977) ).
Rather than free rider problems from the natural economy, we have used scenarios involving a two-player public goods game like those typically used in generating stylized facts about the determinants of contributions to public goods 22 and in inspiring theory development. 23 Yet, whether people perceive a moral dimension to the interaction between them in public goods experiments and, if so, how their moral judgments vary with features of the interaction, has hitherto been unexplored. This is the gap we address.
Our study leaves interesting avenues for further research, including the relationship between moral judgments and (contribution and sanctioning) behaviour in experimental public goods games; and the robustness of our findings on judgment across alternative designs and across a wider range of social dilemmas, including more naturalistic ones, and/or across subject-pools more representative of the general population. 24 But, nevertheless, it provides a useful step in the empirical analysis of moral judgment of free riding. Our main findings can be summarized as follows:
Finding 1: On average, free riding is judged morally reprehensible in all cases considered, except that it is judged morally commendable to "rat on a rat" (i.e. to free ride knowing that the co-player has already free ridden).
Finding 2: Ceteris paribus, failure to contribute to the public good is condemned more strongly, on average, than total withdrawal of support from the public good. This holds both in the Simultaneous and the Sequential treatment.
Finding 3: On average, moral judgments conform to the increasing condemnation hypothesis (that a free rider is condemned more strongly the larger is the effective contribution of his co-player). In Simultaneous treatments, about half of subjects pass judgments on the free rider that are independent of the effective contribution of the other player. Yet, the overwhelming majority of subjects in Sequential treatments conform to the increasing condemnation hypothesis, as do a substantial minority in Simultaneous treatments.
Finding 1 is the most fundamental, in that it suggests that public goods problems are perceived as having a moral dimension. Subjects do not, in general, give neutral moral judgments of a free rider in our scenarios. Given this, the question becomes what drives the judgments they do give. Findings 2 and 3 are part of the answer to this question. Together, they show that moral judgments of the free rider are sensitive 22 For overviews, see Ledyard (1995); Zelmer (2003); and Gächter and Herrmann (2009) . 23 See, for example, Gintis (2003) ; Fehr and Schmidt (2006); Fehr and Gintis (2007) ; and Gintis et al. (2008) . 24 For recent steps in a naturalistic direction using s similar impartial spectator method (albeit in different public policy contexts and using a different form of moral judgment), see Konow (2009). to the framing of the scenario and, in some cases, to the behaviour of the other player in it.
We end by interpreting these findings from the perspectives of the reason-based and emotion-based models of moral judgment discussed in Section 3.
Interpreted and that subjects experience a negative emotional response to the betrayal of this trust.
If, in some judges, such reactions of distaste are cued more by relative effective contribution than by consideration of the facts known to the free rider, that would explain the presence of increasing condemnation in Simultaneous treatments (as well as in Sequential ones). Thus accounted for, the finding is in line with the outcome bias in ethical judgments identified by Gino et al. (2009) . Indeed, from this perspective, the surprising feature of our findings is not so much the presence of subjects who conform to the increasing condemnation hypothesis in Simultaneous treatments as the fact that the modal group does not do so.
Emotional responses could also explain the positive evaluation of "ratting on a rat", for example if there is a positive affective response to the first free rider getting what he deserved when the judged player free rides back.
A priori, and given the findings of research in moral psychology (Haidt (2001)) the emotion-based model seems a promising way to explain framing effects in judgments, as it is quite possible that details of the description of different scenarios might cue different emotional responses. However, to explain the direction of the framing effect that we have observed requires more than just this remark and is not straightforward. Our prior expectation was that, if framing made a difference, Player B's free riding would be condemned more strongly when the Take frame is used because, in this case, a zero effective contribution involves abrogating for himself some part of the group project; whereas, in the Give frame, players are merely allocating their own endowment. This conjecture can also be supported by the theory of loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman (1991) ), if the initial status quo is taken as the reference-point. On this view, Player A suffers a loss as a result of Player B's action in the Take frame, but not in the Give frame. If subjects condemn the imposition of losses more strongly than the corresponding failure to grant a gain, Player B would be condemned more strongly in the Take frame, contrary to our Finding 2.
One possible explanation of Finding 2 is that subjects take Person B to have been given a gift (i.e. the endowment) in the Give frame and condemn him for not sharing it; whereas they see the players as having to fend for themselves in the Take frame and are disinclined to judge them harshly for doing so. A related possibility is that subjects see responsibility for the group project as more ambiguous in the Take frame than the Give frame, so cuing stronger moral responses in the latter case.
To conclude, as this discussion shows, it is not straightforward to interpret all of our empirical findings; nor was our design intended to discriminate conclusively between the reason-based and emotion-based models. But, one conclusion does seem clear: our findings cannot be explained by subjects forming their moral judgments by applying simple consequentialist moral principles. Instead, the picture of moral judgments which emerges from our study is one in which they respond to features of the whole situation, not just to the consequences of the judged action, narrowly conceived. 25 We suggest that, whilst it is not impossible to reconcile this feature of our findings with the reason-based model, the totality of the findings fits somewhat more easily with the emotions-based model. 
